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RIGHTS OF SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
THE increased disparity in bargaining power, job security and independ-
ence between rank and file union laborers and supervisory employees,
1
during recent years has transformed numerous foremen and superintendents
from militant anti-union spokesmen for management 2 to active proponents
of self-organization and unionization. The concerted drive for unionization
of supervisory employees has become a paramount issue in management-
labor relations, particularly in mass production industries, only within the
past five years. Prior to that time, organization of foremen had caused no
grave concern, although in a limited number of industries I supervisory
employees customarily had been included in the pattern of unionization.
The movement by supervisory employees to reject the traditional concept
that foremen and superintendents are representatives of management with
no self-interest in the labor movement, and to embrace the labor union
movement was an ultimate product of changing industrial conditions. Cen-
tralization of management, standardization of production, specialization
1. The term "supervisory employee" is used generically to include all employees who
in the course of their duties are vested with the authority to give orders, and who are cloaked
with one, or a combination, of the following powers: to employ, to promote, to demote, to
discharge, to transfer, to apportion work, to maintain production, to grant wage increases,
to discipline or to effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively to recommend such
action. Also, he usually is a salaried rather than hourly worker. The existence of any of
these powers is recognized as an indicium, but not a sole criterion, of such status. These
standards, originally invoked by the National Labor Relations Board to impute liability to
management for discriminatory action by subordinates, have been generally applied to the
question of certification of bargaining representatives. 8 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. (1943) 55-7;
Matter of Borden Mills, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 459 (1939); Matter of Onited Press Associations,
3 N.L.R.B. 344 (1937); 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940)
§ 292.
The term "supervisory employee" has not been definitely circumscribed by the N.L.R.B.
to indicate how high in the hierarchy of management it will be applied. Infra p. 774-7. For
purposes of this discussion, "supervisory employee" will not be applied to those representa-
tives of management who are concerned with the determination of policy.
Although "supervisory employee" is often used interchangeably with terms like "fore-
man," "supervisor" and "superintendent," the fact that an employee is given a job title
commonly ascribed to a supervisory employee, does not control. See Matter of Richards
Chemical Works, Inc., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 617 (1945), where "foremen"
were held not to be supervisory employees; cf. Matter of Allied Steel Castings Co., 66
N.L.R.B. No. 128, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 1114 (1946).
2. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, HOW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS (ed. by
Harry A. Millis, 1942) 547, 558.
3. Printing trades, building trades, metal trades, maritime industry and railroad in-
dustry. Also postal and railway mail service. Union Membership and Collective Bargaining
by Foremen (June 1943) 56 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 1049.
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and integration of departments and rigid managerial controls robbed super-
visory employees of many of their former powers and responsibilities; and
management failed to offer any compensation for this loss of discretion and
independence.4 The duties of a supervisor in industry tdday generally are
no longer identifiable with the functions of the traditional foreman. The
plenary authority to employ, transfer, promote, demote, discipline or dis-
charge subordinates is gone. Particularly in mass production industries,
stringent personnel and management policies have relegated supervisory
officials to a position of "traffic cop." '
Union recognition and closed shop agreements generally resulted in pay
raises, shorter hours and better working conditions for the rank and file
workers, with little or no benefits accruing to supervisors. When industry
became geared to wartime production, former union members temporarily
promoted to jobs of assistant foremen and foremen felt strongly their loss of
seniority rights as production workers; 6 these men, indoctrinated in prin-
ciples of labor organizations, led the movement to secure for foremen union
benefits comparable to those which they lost upon promotion. Companies,
often compelled to start new foremen on an increased pay scale, failed to
raise the compensation of senior foremen to the same or higher level.7 At
the same time, although rank and file laborers were earning overtime pay,
sometimes receiving a total remuneration in excess of their supervisors,
supervisory employees were called upon to work excessive hours with no
additional compensation. Rarely was attention given to adequate pay
differentials or base pay proportionate to responsibilities. Foremen were
gravely concerned with a lack of security-they were often subject to dis-
criminatory discharges with no recourse to higher corporate officials; 8 they
often had no hearings before discharge, no grievance machinery, no accident
4. "Whereas he was formerly an executive with considerable freedom of action, he is
now an erecutor carrying out orders, plans, and policies determined above. .. ." BILB
Panel Reports o n Foremen (1945) 15 LAB. REL. REP. 724, 725 (summary of a report and
findings of a special panel of the War Labor Board headed by Prof. Sumner H. Slichter).
5. Matter of Packard lotor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LAB. REL. REP. 163, 169
(1945), approved, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 505 (1945); (1946) 34 CALw-. L.
Rlv. 245; (1945) 34 GEo. L. J. 89.
6. In the Ford lotor Co. union-shop agreement with the United Automobile Workers,
it was specifically provided that production workers would cease to acquire seniority when
promoted to supervisory capacity. History of Foreman's Association (1946) 17 LAB. Rn.
REP. 886 (summary of study by Bureau of Labor Statistics).
7. Such a salary disparity occurred in the Chrysler Plant where four newly-appointed
foremen were paid $220 per month for work in the same division with eight foremen who
continued to receive $205 per month for comparable work. Hearings tfore Committee or
Military Affairs on H. R. 2239, H. R. 1742, H. 1. 1728 and H. R. 992, 78th Cong., Ist S.
(1943) 489 et seq.
8. A foreman in the coal industry with compensation of $230 per month was on
December 1, 1940 placed on day wages whenever work was available. For the following two
weeks he received compensation of $22.05. Upon requesting more work, he was discharged
and evicted from a company-owned house with two weeks' notice. Id. at 641-2.
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or sickness protection, no standard seniority provisions. Moreover, they
objected to the loss of prestige and authority which they suffered from the
failure of management to give them adequate support; dealings by manage-
ment directly with subordinates or union shop stewards who found it ex-
peditious to by-pass impotent supervisors undermined their responsibility.
These conditions, although not universal, were sufficiently catholic to
stimulate a comparatively rapid development in the unionization of super-
visory employees. The movement was accelerated by the organization of the
independent Foreman's Association of America 10 in September, 1941. Sub-
sequently, the Mine Officials' Union of America, an independent organiza-
tion of foremen in the coal mining industry, became affiliated with the United
Mine Workers of America." Other independent unions and unions affiliated
with international or national organizations developed. 12 In view of manage-
ment's opposition to the organizational attempts of the unions representing
supervisory employees,' 3 it was inevitable that the representatives of super-
visory employees would seek the protective aegis of the National Labor
Relations Act.'4
SHIFTING SANDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
During the four-year period in which the three-man National Labor Rela-
tions Board considered the applicability of the NLRA to organizations of
supervisory employees, the Board reversed its direction twice.15 The basic
issues before the Board were whether or not a supervisory employee was an
"employee" within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA; whether
or not a group of supervisory employees represented by an independent
union was an appropriate unit to be certified under the provisions of Sec-
9. For evidence of general employment conditions of supervisory employees, see gen-
erally id. at 299-378, 489-516, 641-695, 706-775; WLB Panel Reports on Foremen (1945)
15 LAB. REL. REP. 724; History of Foreman's Association (1946) 17 LAn. REt. REP. 886,
10. The Foreman's Association of America in June 1945 had 281 chapters with over
28,000 members. History of Foreman's Association (1946) 17 LAB. RE.. REP. 886.
11. The Mine Officials' Union of America was succeeded by the United Clerical, Tech-
nical and Supervisory Employees' Union of the Mining District, Division of District 50,
United Mine Workers of America (AFL). This union was petitioner in Matter of Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAn. REt. REP. 971 (1946).
12. Gartenhaus, The Foreman Goes Union (1945) 113 NEw REPUBLIC 563.
13. The organizational struggle of rank and file workers is to some extent being dupli-
cated in the efforts of supervisory employees to unionize. Matter of Packard Motor Car Co.
61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LAB. REL. REP. 168, 169 (1945), approved, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 LAn.
REL. REP. 506 (1945); Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 2239, I1. R.
1742, H. R. 1728 and H. R. 992, 78th Cong., lst Sess. (1943) 311.
14. Also known as the Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
29 U. S. C. § 151-166 (1940) hereinafter cited by section number only.
15. Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943); Matter of Packard
Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LAB. RE. REP. 168 (1945), approved, 64 N.L.R.B. No.
204, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 506 (1945).
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tions 9(b) and 9(c) of the NLRA for collective bargaining purposes; or
whether or not a group of supervisory employees represented by a local
union accepting rank and file membership, or affiliated with a national or
international union accepting rank and file membership, was the appropriate
unit to bargain collectively. Only on the ruling that a supervisory employee
was an "employee" within the meaning of the Act has the Board been con-
sistent.
Protection of the Act Accorded Supervisory Employees. In the 1942 case of
first impression, Mlatter of Union Collieries Coal Company,"' the Board deter-
mined that a unit of supervisory employees to be represented by the in-
dependent Mine Officials' Union of America was appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining. In both the original hearing and the rehearing, a
strong dissent was written by Board Member Gerald D. Reilly. Questioning
that a supervisory employee was an "employee" within the meaning of the
act, Mr. Reilly maintained that it was incumbent upon the Board to deter-
mine in each case whether inclusion or exclusion of supervisory personnel
within a bargaining unit would serve to effectuate the policies of the Act.
His conclusion that supervisory personnel in the coal industry should not be
represented even by an unaffiliated union, implied a denial of affirmative
rights of collective bargaining under the Act to any supervisory employees.
other than members of unions traditionally encompassing supervisors.
The majority ruling was buttressed by the decision in the Matter of God-
chaux Sugars, Incorporated,17 in which the Board refused to deprive super-
visory employees of the statutory rights granted in the Union Collieries case
because the foremen chose as their representative the C.I.O. local represent-
ing production and maintenance employees of the company. A dissent
again was entered by Mr. Reilly. This short-lived ruling obtained for only
seven months.' s
Minority Ruling Becomes Majority. With a change in Board membership,'2 -
the entire question was re-examined in 1943 in the Mfatter of Maryland Dry-
16. 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942), approved, 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942).
17. 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942). The ruling in this case .was employed as a precedent in-
Matter of Harmony Short Line Transportation Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 757 (1942), wherein ticlet
agents and dispatchers, supervisory employees, were allowed reprezentation by an AFL
affiliate which bargained for the bus drivers of the same employer. Mfr. Reilly did not tahe
part in the decision.
18. During which time the Board recognized the right of one union to repreent three
appropriate units of supervisory employees. Mlatter of Murray Corp. of America, 47
N.L.R.B. 1003 (1943) (dissent by Mr. Reilly), rev'd, 51 N.L.R.B. 94 (1943) (Marlnd
Drydock controlling); Matter of Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 115 (1942), reed,
52 N.L.R.B. 309 (1943) (Maryland Drydock controlling); see latter of Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1942). But ef. Matter of Bo.ing.Aircraft Co., 45 N.L.R.B.
630 (1942), reed in effect, 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943); Matter of Stanley Co. of America, 45
N.L.R.B. 625 (1942).
19. ir. John Houston replaced Mir. William Leiserson as member of the three-man
board.
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dock Company,20 in which a CI.O. affiliate union which represented non-
supervisory employees petitioned to have units of supervisory employees
declared appropriate. Mr. Reilly, writing the majority opinion, disclaimed
the basic conclusions of previous cases on the ground that no consideration
had been given to the question whether units of foremen effectuated the basic
policies of *the NLRA. The instant ruling questioned the inclusion of super-
visory employees as employees within the meaning of the Act, but by reading
Sections 2(3) and 9(b) together, the majority concluded that the NLRB
had been reserved the administrative discretion to determine whether under
the Act a supervisor was an employee to be included in a collective bargain-
ing unit. Without distinguishing the two considerations, the majority found
that no bargaining unit for supervisory employees, unless supported by
historical development, would effectuate the purposes of the Act, and be
appropriate. Chairman Millis, in dissent, strongly contested the proposition
that supervisory employees, regardless of type of representation or classifica-
tion, could be denied the protection of the Board's machinery to insure
collective bargaining.
The Maryland Drydock decision was rigidly applied 21 for over two years,
so that no unit of supervisory employees, whether or not affiliated with
organizations representing rank and file laborers, was recognized as ap-
propriate. But in Matter of Soss Manufacturing Company,22 the Board sub-
sequently established another explanation for its refusal to recognize in-
dependent supervisors' unions. The independent Foreman's Association of
America brought charges against an employer for having discriminately
discharged a supervisor for union activity.23 In ruling that supervisory em-
ployees must be accorded the protection of the Act against unfair labor
practices, the Board implicitly recognized that organization by supervisory
employees came within the purview and protection of the NLRA. How-
ever, the Board sanctioned the rigid Maryland Drydock rule on the tenuous
grounds that its objective was to prevent representation of supervisory
employees by an organization also representing, or affiliated with an organi-
zation representing, non-supervisory employees; and that in questions
pertaining to certification, there was no assurance that an independent
organization would not become affiliated with a rank and file union before
the lapse of the year in which such certification would be customarily valid.
Therefore, the Board would deny such recognition to all units of supervisory
employees.
20. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). Compare majority opinion and dissenting opinion in
Matter of Union Collieries, 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942), approved, 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942).
21. Matter of General Motors Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457 (1943); Matter of Boeing Air-
craft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67 (1943); rev'g in effect, 45 N.L.R.B. 630 (1942); ef. Matter of
Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1760 (1944) when the Board refused to
recognize U.C.T. as bargaining representatives of non-supervisory clerical and technical
employees because of the large menbership of supervisory employees in that union.
22. 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944).
23. Violation of § 8(3).
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The Board Reverses Itself Again. This incongruous position was not main-
tained for long. When the question squarely came before the Board again
in the M21atter of Packard M1otor Car Company,24 a shifting of position by the
junior and controlling member of the Board, Mr. John Houston, "3 forced
another reversal in policy, and supervisory employees in a mass production
industry were constituted an appropriate unit to be represented by an in-
dependent organization. In a subsequent hearing, -' 3 the Board held im-
material any evidence that the independent union might, in the future, be
linked with a rank and file organization. This ruling, however, was specif-
ically restricted to the "traffic cop" type of supervisor.
After the Packard case, the Board was deluged with petitions for recogni-
tion filed by supervisors' unions.-7 In Matter of Young Spring & Wire
Corporation,2 the Board extended the ruling in the Packard case to cover
supervisory employees in non-mass production industries, with duties more
extensive than those of a "traffic cop" supervisor, when represented by
independent unions. As a final step, the Board, in Matter of Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation,2 recently held that, if selected by the two units of supervi-
sory employees designated by the Board as appropriate, the United Clerical,
Technical and Supervisory Employees Union of the Mining Industry,
Division of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, a direct affiliate
of the union representing the production and maintenance workers, could
be certified as the representative of those supervisory employees for the
purposes of collective bargaining. After a tortuous effort, the Board had
found its original decision of four years back z0 to be good law.
24. 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LAB. R.L. REP. 16S (1945), approved, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204,
17 LAB. REL. REp. 506 (1945).
25. Mr. Reilly was again the dissenter.
26. Matter of Paclmrd Motor Car Co., 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 Ln. REL. RE. 506
(1945), approving, 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LA . Ru. REP. 163 (1945).
See concurring opinion by Chairman Paul Herzog, who had replaced Chairman Millis
in the interim. In the Paclard case the Board under Chairman Millis vs patently con-
cerned with existing insecurity and economic dependence of foremen, but subzequently the
majority, headed by Chairman Herzog, specifically refused to consider the efficacy of fore-
man's unions. Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, p. 12, 17 LAn.
REL. REP. 971, 972 (1946).
27. Matter of B. F. Goodrich Co., 65 N.L.LB. No. 58, 17 LAB. Rn.. REP. 692 (1946);
Matter of Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 17 LB. Ru. P. 783 (194 6);
Matter of Simmons Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 17 LAB. Rm. REP. 320 (1946); Matter of
Midland Steel Products Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 358 (1946); Matter of
Federal-Mogul Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 17 LAn. REL. REP. 975 (1946); Matter of Keley-
Hayes Wheel Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 975 (1946); Matter of Celotex
Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 984 (1946); Matter of American Smelting
and Refining Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 986 (1946).
28. 65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 6S7 (1946). Dissent by Mr. Reilly.
29. 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAB. REL. RuP. 971 (1946). Dissent by Mr. Reilly.
30. Note that the majority opinion makes no reference to the previously controlling
Maryland Drydock case, but does cite the Godchaux case.
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LEGISLATIVE MANDATE
Throughout the quest by supervisors' unions for protection under the
Wagner-Connery Labor Act, much attention has been directed toward
policy considerations at the expense of rigid statutory interpretation-in
part a reflection of the deep concern of the Board in the practical adminis-
tration of the Act, and in part a result of a lack of judicial direction. Until
the concurring opinion of Chairman Herzog in the Packard case and the
majority opinion in the Young Spring & Wire case, there was no substantial
distinction drawn between the application of the statute and the merits of
unionization for supervisory employees.
"Employee" under the Act. Section 2(3) of the Act provides that "the
term 'employee' shall include any employee ... ." 31 That supervisory
employees come within the terms of this definition was recognized by the
Board 32 and had been given judicial sanction 13 before the question of col-
lective bargaining by foremen through unionization had become acute. To
the extent that he is an employee under the Act, the courts have accorded
to the foreman the guarantees of self-organization and collective bargaining
of Section 7 14 and the protection against discrimination and unfair labor
practices under the provisions of Section 8.35 The conclusion appears in-
escapable that a supervisory employee, accepted as an "employee" for the
purposes of some sections of the Act, would be entitled to all rights, protec-
tion and privileges under that Act not specifically withheld from him.
The courts have found no inconsistency between the interpretation of a
foreman as an "employee" and the definition of an employer in Section 2(2)
as "any person acting in the interest of the employer, directly or indi-
rectiy ... ." 36 In cases where discriminatory acts of supervisory employees
violate the spirit of Section 8, their acts have not been condemned per se as
31. "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the chapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any indi-
vidual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or per-
son at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse."
32. Matter of The Harris-Hub Bed & Spring Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 123 (1939); Matter of
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 7 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1938).
33. NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940);
see Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, 98 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1938).
34. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 146 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. Sth, 1945); cert.
denied, 325 U. S. 886 (1945), rehearing denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 15 (U. S. 1945).
35. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. NLRB, 127 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942); Eagle-Picher
Mining & Smelting Co. v. NLRB, 119 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
36. "The term 'employer' includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States, or any state or political sub-
division thereof, or any person subject to sections 151-163 of Title 45, or any labor organiza-
tion (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or
agent of such labor organization." § 2(2).
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acts by "employers"; they have been held to be violative of the law because
they have been imputed from employee to employer under the doctrines of
agency, 37 respondent superior 33 and other concepts of liability." In his
relations with subordinate laborers, the foreman is a representative of his
employer, and consequently an employer under Section 2(2). In bargaining
with his employer to further his own interests or to better the terms and
conditions of his employment, the foreman is an employee.4 3 The Board is
thus precluded from holding these two terms mutually e-xclusive. 4'
In a comprehensive, definitive examination of the meaning of "employee"
under the Act, the Supreme Court recently refused to treat it as a word of
art, but rather stated that it derived meaning from the statute when read
in the light of the mischief to be corrected.42 The applicability of the Act
was to be determined broadly in accordance with underlying economic facts,
rather than technically and exclusively in accordance with previously
established legal dogma. Moreover, it was not "irrelevant" 13 that workers
who sought protection of the Act were subject, as an economic fact, to evils
the statute was designed to eradicate. When applied to the instant problem,
this ratio decidendi would strongly support a conclusion that supervisory
employees come within the terms of the NLRA!
The determination by the NLRB that supervisory employees come
within the meaning of Section 2(3) is not only supported by these collateral
court decisions, but is also strengthened by the judicial recognition that the
task to erect definitive limitations around the word "employee" is singularly
reserved to the Board. And the Board's conclusion that specified persons
are "employees" is to be accepted if it has warrant in the record and a
reasonable basis in law.44
The claim that a supervisory employee does not come within the board
terms of this definition has been advanced by a member of the Board only
37. See Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. NLRB, 106 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), (1939)
53 HAlv. L. REV. 332.
38. See NLRB v.A. S. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
39. The Supreme Court has gone beyond the narrow limits of the doctrines of agency
and respondeat superior. Justice Douglas has stated that the court is not dealing "with
private rights ... nor with technical concepts pertinent to an employer's legal respoani-
bility to third persons for acts of his servants, but with a clear legislative policy to free the
collective bargaining process from all taints of an employer's compulsion, domination, or
influence." International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72, 80 (1940). H. J.
Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1941); NLRB v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 118 F. (2d)
780 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941).
40. NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
41. Matter of Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944).
42. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944), rdhcarirg dcried 322 U. S.
769 (1944), which involved the question of whether or not Los Angele3 newsboys were em-
ployees within the meaning of the NLRA.
43. Id. at 127.
44. Id. at 131.
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in cautious terms,4 5 based principally upon a relationship with management
and upon a constructed intent of Congress. The Railway Labor Act, one
recognized precedent for the Wagner-Connery Labor Act,4" defined an
employee as "Every person . . . who performs any work defined as that
of an employee or subordinate official . . ." 11 It has been suggested that,
by omission of the positive phrase "subordinate official," Congress specif-
ically intended to omit supervisory employees from the scope of the Wagner
Act.4" However, with equally as slim authority, it has been argued that
since the Railway Labor Act specifically encompassed such supervisors
within its scope, the NLRA also was applicable to them.50 The Board
finally discarded reference to the Railway Labor Act, frankly admitting that
its application was susceptible to either interpretation. 51
Designation of Appropriate Unit. The Board is compelled, either upon
a proceeding for certification to an employer as the appropriate bargain-
ing unit under Section 9(c) or upon complaint under Section 10 because
of a refusal of an employer to bargain collectively, to "decide in each case
whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining and otherwise to effectuate
the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit or subdivision
thereof."52 Mr. Reilly has seized upon this power to designate the ap-
propriate unit of employees to sustain a denial to foremen and superintend-
ents of affirmative rights to collective bargaining under the Act.
The original intent of Congress concerning the power of the Board under
Section 9(b) is apparent from the wording of the statute. The Board was
authorized to determine whether a craft unit, plant unit, employer unit or
other unit was best suited for the purposes of collective bargaining and self-
45. The majority, in Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943), read
§§ 2(2) and 9(b) together, and without delimiting the scope of the word "employee," held
that the determination of the question whether or not supervisors are employers who can
constitute an appropriate bargaining unit is a function reserved to the administrative dis-
cretion of the Board. It is noteworthy that in his concurring opinion in Matter of Stanley
Co. of America, 45 N.L.R.B. 625, 629 (1942), Mr. Reilly pointed out that he had previously
dissented from the view that supervisofs were employees within the meaning of the NLRA.
46. Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935), testimony by Senator Robert F. Wagner, 32-56; 2 TELLER, LABOR DIS-
PUTES AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING (1940) 692.
47. 44 STAT. 577, § 1 (1926), 45 U.S. C. § 151 (1940).
48. Dissent in Matter of Union Collieries Coal Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 165, 171, fn. 13 (1942),
approving, 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
49. There is no specific indication that Congress considered the question of supervisory
employees in the enactment of the Wagner-Connery Labor Act.
50. See Matter of Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 966 fn. 4 (1942), ap-
proved 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942).
51. Matter of Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348, 350 (1944).
52. Section 9(b).
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organization, as well as for effectuation of the policies of the Act.P3 Ap-
parently once an individual is determined to be qualified to receive the
protection of the Act, the Board's sole problem is to classify him properly.
It seems to be given no authority under this section to hold that this em-
ployee is entitled to membership in no unit. However, Mr. Reilly placed
paramount emphasis upon the effectuation of policies of the Act and main-
tained that the Board has complete discretion to exclude an employee from
any rights under the section, if inclusion would be considered in derogation
of the Act. This theory would give the Board limitless power to deny
membership in any unit to any force of labor, the organization of which is
deemed to run counter to the policies of the Act.
The duty of the Board to group laborers who are "employees" under the
Act in a bargaining unit, the major premise of the Pachard and Jones &
Laughlin rulings, receives indirect support from the Supreme Court. The
Court has stated that although the precise meaning of § 9(b) have not been
defined, it was certain that they both were circumscribed by the words
"employer," "plant" and "craft." 54 And the unit selected must insure
efficient collective bargaining. There was, however, no recognition that
within the delegated authority of the Board was the right to exclude cer-
tain employees from collective bargaining units.
Furthermore, in selecting appropriate units for collective bargaining pur-
poses, the Board has been charged with accepting public interest as a para-
mount consideration and has been reversed on court review if its decree has
been viewed to run counter to public policy. 5 However the considerations
of public policy have been applied to the character of the representation
within the limits of § 9(b) and represent no recognition of the power of the
53. The Bill, as first proposed, carried as the only qualification to the choice of unit by
the Board, the effectuation of the policies of the Act. Hearings before the Comtiflec on Edu-
cation and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 4. The goal of insuring to employees
the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining was inmerted at
the suggestion of the Attorney General to provide a nominal standard within which the
Board could designate appropriate units. A similar provision appears in the Railway Labor
Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 1186, § 2 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 152 (1940). Report of the Commike on.
Labor on S. 1958, H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 22.
54. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941), which, involving
the selection between a multiple plant or single plant unit as appropriate unit for collective
bargaining, held that the determination by the Board of an appropriate unit will not be
overthrown by the courts unless it is arbitrary and capricious.
55. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 146 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944),
remanded, 325 U. S. 838 (1945), approved on olher grounds, F. (2d), 17 L, . R. REP. 1270,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1946). This decision, which will probably be taken to the Supreme Court,
held that guards, who are members of the municipal police force, cannot be represented by
the union representing production and maintenance employees, in view of the fact that the
obligations of such guards to the municipality and state would be incompatible v,with union
obligations in cases of strikes and industrial unrest. It is submitted that the frequent at-
tempts to analogize the rights of supervisory employees with the rights of plant protection
employees fail because of the basic differences in duties, obligations, and status within the
managerial hierarchy, as well as differences in policy considerations.
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Board and refuse certification to any group of employees included within
the Act by Congress.
In interpreting other provisions of the Act, the courts have guaranteed to
supervisors the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing under Section 7, and have
declared as an unfair labor practice interference with these rights." Thus,
the finding of the Board that a designation of a unit of supervisory employees.
for the purposes of collective bargaining is contrary to the policies of the Act,
seems inconsistent with the practice of preventing interference with collec-
tive bargaining activities of these employees.
Nor is the recognition of bargaining units embracing supervisory em-
ployees without precedent. In industries which traditionally have included
supervisory employees within their schemes of unionization, units have been
composed either solely of supervisors, 7 or of both supervisors and their
subordinates. Although in other industries the Board has normally ex-
cluded supervisory employees from bargaining units of ordinary employees,
it has usually included supervisory employees in rank and file units at the
option of all interested unions, unless the specific supervisory employees,
bear a very close connection with management. 9 However, the Board's.
action in excluding supervisory employees from mixed units is directed
toward the protection of subordinate employees from employer-domination, 6O'
which objection is not present in a bona fide, independent bargaining unit
composed solely of supervisory employees.
Majority Choice of Representatives. Implicit in the rejectioh by Mr. Reilly
of appropriate units of supervisory employees is a denial of the statutory
right of employees to choose collective bargaining representatives by ma-
jority vote. Disregarding considerations of unregulated selection, he em-
phasized the basic evil of affiliation of supervisory and non-supervisory
groups. He would not certify independent units of supervisory employees,.
56. See case cited supra, note 35.
57. Extensively in railroad industry. Union Membership and Collective Bargaining by.
Foremen (1943), 56 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1049.
58. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 146 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945); cert..
denied, 325 U. S. 886 (1945), rehearing denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 15 (U. S., 1945) (maritime);
Matter of John Dickinson Schneider, 59 N.L.R.B. 1133 (1944) (printing); Matter of Ohio,
Barge Line, Inc., 59 N.L.R.B. 154 (1944) (maritime).
In Matter of Coos Bay Lumber Co., 62 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 16 LAB. REL. R.P. 526 (1945),
(logging), the majority justified the exception based on custom on the ground that with
such a heritage, supervisory employees would not reflect management policies, would not?
impair freedom of other employees, and would not undermine existing discipline. In, addi-
tion, there was a definite community of interest among employees of both classes. Appar-
ently, the crucial point is the protection of other employees.
59. Matter of Campbell Machine Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 793 (1937); 3 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP-
(1938) 180; 2 TELLER, LABOR DiSPUTES AND COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING (1940) § 350.
60. 4 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. (1939) 94; see Hearings before the Committee on Labor on,
H. R. 4749, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Supp. 26.
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-because of the fear that there existed no effective prohibition against amal-
gamation with rank and file unions through common representation.
Aside from policy considerations, there appears little statutory basis for
a refusal to group employees within appropriate bargaining groups because
of their choice of representatives. In fact, such a rationale runs counter to
the specific provisions, as well as the spirit, of the Act. Section 7 of the Act,
-which has been extended to supervisory employees, guarantees to workers
-collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. Sec-
tion 9(a) provides that representatives shall be selected by the majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit. Consideration of proper representa-
tives of any unit must await, not precede, selection of an appropriate unit.
'Thus any refusal to designate an appropriate unit because of a possible
-choice by its majority appears to be a perversion of the principle of majority
rule 62 which pervades the statute.
Congressional Intent. The problem of organization of supervisory em-
ployees not being in evidence when the National Labor Relations Act was
enacted, it is not surprising that specific indicia of legislative intent as to
their rights of collective bargaining are lacking. With the problem appar-
-ently ignored, any consideration of Congressional intent must be posed in
terms of how Congress would have reacted- 3 The stated purposes of the
Act,6 4 are the encouragement of the practice and procedure of collective
-bargaining; and the protection of the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing. It attempts to eliminate industrial strife resulting from a
refusal to bargain collectively and to remedy the inequality of bargaining
-power between employee and employer. These policies would seem clearly
to endorse recognition of appropriate units of supervisory employees unless
-such recognition of appropriate units of supervisory employees unless such
recognition of appropriate units of supervisory employees would substan-
tially impair the rights to collective bargaining of another class of workersc'
61. Matter of Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944); Matter of Paclard Motor Car
Co., 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 LAD. REL. REP. 506 (1945), approing, 61 N.L.R.B. No. 4,
16 LAB. REL. REp. 168 (1945).
62. See testimony of Senator Robert F. Wagner, Hearings before the Conrtilc or
-Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 43.
63. For unsuccessful constructions by reference to Railway Labor Act. Fee SUpra, p. 762.
64. Section 1. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944), rehraring
denied, 322 U. S. 769 (1944); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261
(1938).
65. In the Packard case, the company maintained that there was no intent of Congrezs
to include supervisory employees within the terms of the Act because at the time of the
enactment, foremen were not engaged in industrial strife. The Board shrugged the claim
aside with the observation that under such construction each representation case would
turn on whether or not the employees involved were organized and engaged in strikes when
the statute was enacted.
In the dissenting opinion of that case, Mr. Reilly pointed out that the enacting clauz-e
upecifically applied to employees who were underpaid and neglected. He supported a con-
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There is less doubt, however, as to how subsequent Congresses felt toward
the problem of according to supervisory employees rights under the N.L.R.A.
On several occasions Congress has considered proposals which would deny
supervisory employees the status of employees under the Act 11 or which
would prohibit membership of supervisory employees in any labor organiza-
tion engaged in collective bargaining, 7 but to date, none of these proposals
have been enacted.
CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY AND PRACTICE
Fear of practical consequences, not legislative interpretation, gives rise
to the most serious objections to the recognition of appropriate units of
supervisory employees. Traditional concepts which viewed supervisory
employees as agents of management in regulating the rank and file worker,
were sorely tested by the organization of supervisory employees; adherents
of these concepts were disillusioned when those organizations became
affiliated with rank and file labor unions. The natural reaction was for
management to advocate the prohibition of foremen's unions,O or in the
alternative, to urge a denial of affirmative benefits of the Wagner Act on
the grounds that such unions did not effectuate the policies of the Act. The
resolution of policy considerations will doubtless weigh heavily in the
ultimate application of the statute to supervisory employees.
Economic warfare may result from a denial to supervisors of the affirma-
tive rights to collective bargaining under the NLRA. The constitutional
rights of supervisory employees to self-organization and collective bargain-
ing are inviolate,69 and can be invoked without the alternative and addi-
tional support of the Wagner Act. Unions of supervisory employees can
bargain collectively outside the framework of the Wagner Act, and can
obtain recognition through contracts with management, regardless of the
composition or affiliation 70 of the union. The additional protection ac-
struction omitting foremen from the Act by claiming that foremen are found in the upper
one-third income bracket.
66. See H. R. 4908, commonly known as the Case Bill, as passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives, February 7, 1946; the provision of the bill depriving supervisory employees of
the status of "employee" under the Wagner Act was removed from the bill in Senate Com-
mittee on Education and Labor. Final bill was vetoed, Newark Evening News, June 11, 1946,
p. 1. See also, H. R. 1996 (1943) (the term "employee" for the purposes of the NLRA shall
not include a bona fide executive administrative, professional or supervisory employee).
67. H. R. 2239 (1943); cf. H. R. 4749 (1939) which would allow supervisory employees,
defined as those employees with power to hire and fire, and higher ranks, to become members
of any labor organization, and opposition of NLRB to that proposal. Hearings before Com-
mittee on Labor on H. R. 4749, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Supp. 26.
68. See Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 2239, H. R. 1742, H. R.
1728 and H. R. 992, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 1-201.
69. See Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570
(1930); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439 (1911); 1 TELLER, LADOR
DISPUTES AND CoLrLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) 164.
70. Subject to the caveat that the NLRB might conceivably exercise indirect control
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corded to the supervisor 7 ' by the NLRB against unfair labor practices
and discriminations against union members, necessarily strengthens the
bargaining position of supervisory empleyees. Unless management is willing
to accept representatives of supervisors, or unless the peaceful machinery of
collective bargaining under the Act is made available to those supervisors,
the only alternative may be a resort to strikes 7 2 and other weapons of
economic strife-the obstructions to commerce that the Act was intended
to eliminate.
Incidence of organiation of superuisory employees upon ranh and file em-
ployees. Mr. Reilly, in his unswerving opposition to the recognition of units
of supervisory employees, has leaned very heavily upon marshalling of
potential evils which would result from such recognition. Not the least
serious, from the point of view of effectuating the policies of the Act, is the
contention that units of supervisory employees would impinge upon the
freedom of the rank and file laborers in their selection of bargaining repre-
sentativesY3 This fear arises from the accepted belief that foremen, in the
position of authority, will influence and coerce subordinates; it is a reflection
of previous Board policy to impute to an employer as unfair labor practices,
attempts by foremen to influence the choice of laborers.
If units of supervisory employees, affiliated with rank and file unions, are
allowed to operate unregulated, these fears may be justified. Unionization
of rank and file workers may be attempted by rejected labor unions through
organization of supervisory employees in the industry. 4 In an industry
with dual unionism, attempts may be made by union organizers to influence
the choice of ordinary laborers through foremen who are members of an
affiliate union or who constitute an appropriate unit represented by the
same union. Even more subversive is the possibility that management,
favoring one union against another, will skillfully place its foremen in
organizations affiliated with the favored union; then, unless a direct agency
by refusing to certify representatives of a bargaining unit of production and maintenance
workers of the same plant, if the representatives are affiliated with the supervitor's organi-
zation. See Matter of Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1760 (1944).
71. Matter of Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 343 (1944).
72. As witnessed by the strike of foremen, followed by government seizure, in the coal
industry in September, 1944 to force reversal of the Maryland DryderP policy, as well as to
gain recognition of foremen's unions, N. Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1944, p. 32, col. 1, and by the
strikes of September 1945 which shut down 92 fields and made idle 33,000 workers, X. Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1945, p. 14, col. 6. One of the demands of the United Mine \Vorkers in the
general soft coal strike which started on April 1, 1946 was the recognition of the rights of
supervisory employees to unionize. X. Y. Times, March 12, 1946, p. 18, col. 3.
73. Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAu. Rm. RP.
971 (1946) (dissenting opinion); Matter of Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 343 (1944).
74. Compare with Matter of Stanley Co. of America, 45 N.L.R.B. 625 (1942), where a
C.I.O. affiliate attempted to organize the supervisory employees in theatres at a time vhen a
bulk of the rank and file employees had not been organized. This situation led to a charge
of "organization from above" in a concurring opinion by Mr. Reilly. Id. at 629.
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is proved, it is unlikely that any coercive acts of the foremen could be
imputed to the employer.
7
3
Such considerations, however, ignore the fact that foremen who are
members of independent unions will not generally be concerned with unioni-
zation of the rank and file laborers, except that they might possibly display a
predilection toward labor organization. If foremen are affiliated with rank
and file unions, protection can be given laborers by management against
capricious or discriminating acts of supervisors. Employers can be required
to declare unequivocally that the foremen do not represent the opinions of
management on questions of labor; 76 moreover, supervisory employees may
be prohibited from participating in the union activities of subordinates
through exercise of the employer's power to discharge or discipline super-
visory employees for interference with the union activities of subordinates. 7
It must be furthei recognized that these possible abuses are not created
by the NLRB's action in certifying bargaining representatives of super-
visory employees, but are the result of unionization of supervisors. If such
abuses do exist, they are present in unions of supervisory employees not
accepted within the pale of the NLRA. In view of the fact that these pos-
sible threats to the freedom of the average laborer cannot be eliminated,
it would seem desirable to bring them within the control of the Board. Those
conditions will then continue to prevail only if the Board fails to regulate
abuses as they appear.
It is important to note that the national and international labor unions
representing rank and file employees lead the present drive to unionize
foremen and to associate those units with the rank and file Labor movement.
75. Compare ppssible results, in absence of the doctrine of imputation, in the fact situa-
tions in Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. NLRB, 119 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941)
wherein an independent union, allegedly organized by the employer and its foremen in a
drive to defeat a C.I.O. strike, later became affiliated with the A.F.L.; International Asso-
ciation of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72 (1940), in which case the employer signed an
agreement with an A.F.L. union after a concerted C.I.O. drive; at the time, alleged super-
visory employees openly shifted their support from a company union to the union selected
by their employer; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. NLRB, 127 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942)
wherein although an A.F.L. union had hitherto been unsuccessful, the employer called upon
another A.F.L. affiliate to counter a drive by a C.I.O. affiliate.
76. The influence that workers may wield over other employees is not restricted to the
control of foremen over subordinates. In the Jones & Laughlin case, the company offered
evidence that the supervisors were recruited by direct action of rank and file members of
the U.M.W.A. Brief for the Company in Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., pp. 76-85.
In this light, it is pertinent that the NLRA was originally intended to protect employees from
unfair action by employers, not from influences of other employees. § 1.
77. See Matter of Ecusta Paper Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 17 LAD. REL. REP. 1151
(1946). But when employer had no effective policy of neutrality, or was attempting to defeat
union activity, discharge of a supervisory employee is in derogation of his rights. Matter of
American Steel Foundries, 67 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 1180 (1946)l Matter of
Climax Engineering Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 17 LAn. REL. REP. 1154 (1946). The Board
may also find it expedient to accept the proposition that no employee may participate in the
activities of other appropriate units represented by the same or affiliated union.
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Union leaders welcome foremen into their midst as a means of controlling
arbitrary or abusive supervision. Organized labor apparently does not
want this type of Board protection:"
Incidence upon relationship between supervisory employees and management.
The forces of management feel very keenly that unionization of supervisory
employees would have a perilous effect upon industryP The opposition of
many representatives of management is directed at unionization of super-
visors, and not solely at affiliation with national and international rank and
file labor organizations. In at least one industry,8 ' management feels that if
supervisory employees be grouped in a bargaining unit, that unit be repre-
sented by the same organization that represents the rank and file worker.
In contrast, Mr. Reilly, conceding that units of foremen should be desig-
nated appropriate if their independence could be assured,82 is concerned
primarily with the aspect of affiliation.
Collective bargaining between management and an independent union of
foremen has little practical effect upon the relationship between manage-
ment and its supervisors. Very few of the disastrous predictions offered by
management could possibly be present where there is no affiliation with a
union of ordinary workers. The opposition is based on the conceptual
argument that membership by foremen in a labor organization, with a
resultant conflict of interest, would destroy the traditional equilibrium
between management and labor. These contentions accompanied arguments
similar to those advanced in the struggle against unionization of rank and
file workers.8
When appropriate units of supervisory employees are represented by
organizations accepting ordinary employees or affiliated with rank and file
unions, the fear of a deleterious effect upon management-supervisory em-
ployee relationship is more substantial. Mr. Reilly pointed with great con-
cern, in the Jones & Laughlin case, to the fact that a supervisory employee
who is represented by a union also representing the rank and file workers, is
faced with a direct conflict in allegiances.84 In that case, the U.C.T. which
78. TwENTrnTn CENTURY FUND, How COLLECTIVE BARGAIU1rI Wons (ed. by
Harry A. Millis, 1942) 216.
79. Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 2239, H. R. 1743, H. R 1728
and H. . 992, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 299.
80. See id. at 1-201. For objections advanced by management following the Pachari
case, see Empioyer Opposition to Foremen's Bargaining (1945) 16 LAD. REL. REP. 209.
81. Matter of Union Collieries, 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942), approvcd, 44 N.L.R.B. 165
(1942), one defense of the employer was that if supervisory employees come under the Act,
they should be represented by the U.M.W.A., representatives of the miner. Akso, Hearings
before the Committee on Mfilitary Affairs on H. R. 2339, H. A. 1743, H. IL 1728, and H. R.
992, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 37.
82. Matter of Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348 (1944).
83. Dissent by Chairman Millis in Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733,
746 (1943).
84. Mr. Reilly also makes a unique argument that to hold the supervisory employees
may be represented by the same organization that represents subordinate workers, would be
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petitioned the Board was directly controlled by the U.M.W.A. 5 Its mem-
bers were required to take the Mine Workers' oath of allegiance that they
will "defend on all occasions" and "assist . . . to obtain the highest wages
possible" 11 for, all members of the organization.
Several undesirable results might stem from this duality of allegiance.
The supervisory employee, particularly in a closed shop industry, might
allow the threat of union reprisal to interfere with the efficient performance
of his duties. A breakdown of managerial operations might result from in-
direct control by the union over management, and fraternization among
superiors and their subordinates. The foreman, an arm of management,
would be seated on both sides of the bargaining table. As a representative of
management in the grievance procedure, he would hear complaints of a
fellow union member. These conditions are prophesied to lead to the dis-
ruotion of management-labor relations and to industrial warfare.
The pattern of the argument is completed by reference to the doctrine of
the imputation to management of unfair labor practices of foremen. In any
conflict between unions for representation, it is anticipated that a super-
visor who owes allegiance to one of the conflicting unions, might attempt to
influence his subordinates. The employer would be powerless to discharge
or silence the supervisory employee for fear of a charge of interference with
labor activities of workers and of violation of Section 8 of the NLRAY At
the same time, he might be liable for the interference of his supervisor. More-
over, unless the Board reverses its previous policy of disestablishing in-
dependent unions as company-dominated because of the participation of
supervisory employees, contrary rules would be applicable to independent
and affiliated unions88
These dire predictions, supported by conceptualism rather than factual
evidence, are generally premised on the conclusion that there is a definite
demarcation between management and labor, and that foremen and superin-
tendents, traditionally identified witlr management, have none of the at-
to view the NLRA as "repudiating the historic prohibition of the common law against
fiduciaries serving conflicting interests." Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
733, 740 (1943). See Chairman Millis's dissent, id. at 745, n. 7.
85. The U. C. T., nominally a division of District 50, resembles a division of U.M.W.A.
It has no charter or by-laws but operates directly under the constitution of the U.M.W.A.
Its officers were appointed by the national officials of the U.M.W.A. and their salary paid by
that organization. Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, p. 10, 17
LAB. REL. REP. 971, 973 (1946).
86. Id. at p. 19, n. 3. Mr. Reilly was especially perturbed by the functions of foremen
in the pattern of the coal industry. The foremen in the Jones & Laughlin case bargained for
the company in contracting for "dead work"--additional duties such as setting pit posts,
removing water from working places, etc., compengation for which is determined by indi-
vidual agreement.
87. Compare Matter of Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 17 LAn. REL.
R1ap. 783 (1946); but cf. cases cited supra in note 81.
88. Mr. Reilly's dissent in Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51,
p. 23, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 971, 975 (1946).
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tributes of laborers. This approach does not recognize the accepted fact
that an employee can be a representative of management for some purposes
and a subordinate of management for others.e Nor does it recognize that
some functions peculiar to supervisory employees place them in a third class
separate from management and labor.s Such artificial classification cannot
be deemed determinative of the substantive rights of a group of employees.
The fact that certain time-worn concepts are violated may indicate that the
concepts should be renovated.
The question of divided allegiance has been over-emphasized. A foreman
is subject to immediate discharge for disloyalty. The fear of fraternization
within the union does not take into consideration the fact that the em-
ployees are separated for bargaining purposes into appropriate units; if the
Board maintains a physical segregation of units as well, that fear will be
baseless. The claim that recognition of affiliated supervisory employees'
unions would place foremen on both sides of the bargaining table is fanciful
since the average foreman takes no part in the collective bargaining ac-
tivities between management and rank and file laborers. It is true that the
average foreman does often participate in the grievance procedure, but
involved only in the early stages, his authority is restricted to minor deci-
sions. If management feels that he cannot impartially exercise the limited
discretion granted to him in this procedure, it can delegate these duties to a
higher level of management. Rights under the Act should not be denied to
foremen merely because present practices which may be easily revised will
be affected.
Judicial decisions and rulings of the NLRB do not substantiate a con-
clusion that the doctrine of imputation will favor affiliated unions against
independent unions. It is true that independent unions have been disestab-
lished by the Board as company-dominated, if supervisory employees take
part in their organization,91 but the Board has also ordered employees to
withdraw recognition from affiliated unions following interference by super-
89. See Matter of American Steel Foundries, 67 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 17 LA. Rm. RrP.
1180 (1946) in which the Board acknowledged that a foreman's conduct in preenting griev-
ance of fellow worker, on behalf of foremen's union, is protected by the NLRA. For purpo:_s
of pressing union grievances, the foreman was removed from the clazs of subordinate to
management, and his objection to management's promotion of a rank and file worker to
foreman over a minor supervisory official, was not deemed insubordination.
90. Foremen apparently are the first to deny that they are functionally a part of man-
agement. Hearings before the CommiUee on Military Affairs on H. .R. 2239, H. R. 1742, H. IL
1728 and H. R. 992, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 299-318, 489-516, 641-695, 706-759.
91. "Whole congeries" of facts, in addition to evidence of participation by supanviscry
employees, are usually considered. NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584 (1941); H. J.
Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1941); Matter of Brown Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 17
LAB. RE.. REP. 650 (1946); Contra, NLRB v. Swank Products, Inc., 103 F. (2d) 872
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1939); Cupples Co. Manufacturers v. NLRB, 106 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939), 53 HARv. L. REv. 332; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, 93 F. (2d) 758
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1938).
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-visory employees.92 Because of their very nature, company unions would
'be most closely affected by this principle, and affirmative evidence of in-
-dependent action of employees would often be lacking. The Board's ad-
ministration is flexible enough to become adapted to the recent growth of
-supervisors' unions. The doctrine, accommodated to changing conditions,
now provides that foremen, if eligible to union membership, have the same
-right as ordinary employees to express their views; these acts will not be
imputed to their employers, and unions, independent or affiliated, will not
be disturbed, unless there is an affirmative showing that they were au-
thorized, encouraged or ratified by the employer. 3
Evidence Jrom Actual Practice. The predictions of inherent dangers and
-catastrophic results are supported by none of the industries in which supervi-
-sory employees traditionally have participated in the union movement. In
fact, an examination of these industries indicates that these fears are without
-substantiation.
In the newspaper field, internationals have required foremen of union
-departments to be members of the rank and file union since 1889. The
foremen, well acquainted with union problems, have usually been able to
manage subordinates with the least friction. Publishers, no longer objecting
to unionization of foremen, are now primarily concerned with union disci-
-pline when foremen differ with the local union in interpreting the terms of
the contract. However, a method has been provided for a joint settlement
.of these disputes, and the problem of union discipline is not so common as
to constitute a major issue.94 In book and job printing work, union member-
ship of foremen apparently is so thoroughly established that it becomes an
issue only occasionally in a newly organized plant. Specific advantage is
gained from the strategic position of foremen who can interpret union's
-and management's problems to each other. The fact that foremen are
-subject to discipline by the union, remains a source of difficulty. "The
fear of discipline may interfere with a foreman's efficiency although a strong
foreman is little affected." "
The railroad industry has been functioning for years with unions which
represent separate bargaining groups of supervisors and their subordinates.
92. International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72 (1940) (A.F.L.
-affiliates).
93. NLRB v. Swank Products, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (independent);
Matter of Hartford Courant, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 229 (1945) (A.F.L.);
Matter of Mississippi Valley Steel Co., 64 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 17 LAB. REL. RnP 261 (1945)
(A.F.L.); see NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., 122 F. (2d) 433,438 (C. C. A. Sth, 1941)
(A.F.L.). But when the union did not solicit or accept membership of supervisory employees
-and employer made no direct disavowal of their actions, unfair labor practices were imputed
to the employer. Matter of Brown Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 650 (1946)
(U.M.W.A.).
94. TwENTIETH CENTURY FuND, How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS (ed. by
Harry A. Millis, 1942) 67.
95. Id. at 146, n. 63.
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Although the National Mediation Board has recognized this practice, there
is no evidence of unusual problems. Likewise, there is no indicaton that
serious issues have arisen from the recognition by the NLRB of appropriate
units of supervisory employees in maritime unions. 3
The National Labor Relations Board has recognized the rights of foremen
to collective bargaining under the Wagner Act in certain industries which
have traditionally included them within the collective bargaining scheme.
There now appears little warrant for freezing the development of unioniza-
tion for supervisory employees at its 1935 level. If any of the predicted
consequences do result, they will probably be soluble by the Board, or by
labor and management at the conference table. "Problems which inevitably
arise from the recognition of any class of employees, including supervisory
employees, will find their best and most prompt solution in a system of
collective bargaining where both labor and management display sincerity
and cooperation in day-to-day relationships and proceed to analyze and
resolve their differences instead of holding fast to and debating unestablished
assumptions." 97
It is noteworthy that of the eight states that have labor relations legisla-
tion, two of the three which have considered the problem have accorded the
benefits of the act to supervisory employees. The New York State Labor
Board 1S has established appropriate units of supervisory employees, with
representatives affiliated with the union representing rank and file workers,
and highest court of the state has affirmed these rulings. A similar policy
has been adopted in Massachusetts."' Under a state labor relations law
which now varies considerably from the Wagner Act, 1" the Pennsylvania
court adopted the then existing administrative policy of the NLRB to reach
the opposite conclusion. 10 2
96. Dissent by Chairman Millis in Matter of Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733,
743 (1943). In this respect, see finding in Matter of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
6 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 751 (1943) that many years of successful collective bargaining by build-
ing superintendents have not resulted in the evils predicted by the employers.
97. Opinion of Chairman Millis in Matter of Packard Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. No. 4,
16 LAB. REL. R P. 168, 170 (1945), approred, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 LAI. REL. REr. 506
(1945).
98. Matter of Bee Line Inc., 6 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 6S6 (1943); Matter of Delparke Realty
Corp., 6 N. Y. S. L. R. B. 905 (1943); 8 N. Y. S. L. R. B. ANN. REP. (1944) 14-15, 23-30.
99. In re N. Y. S. L. R. B. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 Misc. 1064, S2 N. Y. S.
(2d) 590 (Sup. Ct., 1944), aff'd mtemo., 269 App. Div. 934, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (1945), affld,
N. Y. 17 LAB. REL. REP. 1248 (1946); Alleghany Ludlum Steel Corp v. Kelley, 184 Mic. 47,
49 N. Y. S. (2d) 762 (Sup. Ct., 1944), aff'd miemo., 269 App. Div. 805, 56 N. Y. S..(2d) 196
(1945), aff'd memo. 295 N. Y. 607 (1946); cert. granted.
100. Matter of Sears, Roebuck & Co., Case No. CR 517, 8 LA~n. REL. rEP. Man. 393
(1941); see also Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. v. Labor Relations Commission, 14 L.n. Rn.
REP. Man. 647 (1944).
101. Herzog, The Labor Redations Acts of le States (Nov. 1942) AmALs oF T"-AnE.xl-
CAN AcADmrY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCmNCE 19.
102. Division 1327 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach
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EXAmiNATION OF THE FUTURE
The present problem has not as yet been squarely before the courts. A
judicial mandate would be welcome at this time when Board consistency
depends primarily upon unchanging Board personnel. That a test case has
not yet reached the courts principally results from the limitation of judicial
review to final orders of the Board prohibiting unfair labor practices.103 Un-
der this provision, an order denying certification cannot be appeaed to the
judiciary by labor representatives; only after the employer contests orders
issued by the Board restraining unfair labor practices, is judicial review
possible. Under present Board policy, a judicial test is forthcoming unless
contemporary Congressional action renders the issue moot.10'
It can be anticipated that the Board's present policy in regard to recogni-
tion of appropriate units of supervisory employees for collective bargaining
purposes will be affirmed. The court, in extending previous rulings, can be
expected to hold that a supervisory employee is an "employee" under the
Act, and that as an employee he has a right to be grouped in a unit ap-
propriate for purposes of collective bargaining. The determination by the
Board of a bargaining unit of supervisory employees may well be concluded
not so capricious and arbitrary as to justify reversal and deemed to effectuate
the basic principles and objectives of the NLRA. It would be desirable for
the court to deny the doctrine that it is within the discretion of the Board to
withhold the privileges of Section 9(b) from Workers who admittedly come
within the scope of the Act.
Other ramifications of the issue deserve speculation. Implicit is the ques-
tion of how far the policy of including supervisory employees within the
scope of the NLRA will be extended in the hierarchy of management. The
Board has included within bargaining units foremen who are alleged to
carry the duties and responsibilities of the old-time foremen, 15 as well as
foremen who are authorized to contract independently for additional work
by their subordinates.' It is noteworthy, however, that no decision of the
Employees of America v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 14 Lab. Rel, Rep. Man.
910 (1944), affirming In re Pittsburgh Ry.'s Employees and Amalgamated Ass'n of Street,
Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, 13 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. 2010
(1944).
103. Section 10(f). See Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB 313 U. S. 146 (1941); A.F. of L.
v. NLRB 308 U. S. 401 (1940).
104. The Packard Motor Car Co. has joined with the NLRB to seek judicial review of
the Board's order in Matter of Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 16 LAB. REL. REr.
168 (1945), aff'd, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 506 (1945). That decree ordered
the company to bargain with a unit of supervisory employees represented by a Foremen's
Association of America affiliate. 17 LAn. REL. REP. 1282 (1946); Dale, The American Fore-
man Unionizes (1946) 19 JouRxAL, OF BusINESS OF TE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGo 25, n. 2.
The Board has refused to defer designation of appropriate bargaining units for super-
visory employees pending a determination by the Supreme Court. Matter of Air-Way
Electric Appliance Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 17 LAn. REL. REP. 1107 (1946).
105. Matter of Celotex Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. -, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 984 (1946).
106. Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 17 LAi. RE. REP.
971 (1946).
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Board has included employees who formulate management policies or who
actually participate in collective bargaining conferences with representa-
fives of rank and file workers. 1 7 Pragmatically, the problem of how high in
the hierarchy of management these concepts will be extended is somewhat
academic; those representatives of management who fill discretionary posi-
tions are not likely to find unionization desirable. Moreover, there is grave
question that a representative of management who fits the description of a
policy-maker bears the attributes of an "employee" under the Act.I
3
The issue of representation of a supervisor's bargaining unit by the same
local union that represents the production and maintenance workers has
not been faced squarely by the Board subsequent to the Godchaux decision
in 1942. In line with recent policy, the Board in the Jones & Laughlin case,
has accepted representation of supervisors by a local which in effect is an
integral part of the national union of rank and file workers. Subsequently
the Board has allowed foremen to bargain through a supervisor's "auxiliary"
of the rank and file local. 10 If the local union claiming representation of
both supervisors and their subordinates is properly constituted, there is
little question that the Board will extend recognition to it.
With the exception of certain industries in which foremen with supervi-
sory authority have customarily been included in the same bargaining units
with rank and file members," 0 there is no reason to doubt that the Board
will continue to segregate supervisors and laborers into separate bargaining
units. Although the Board has permitted minor supervisory employees to
be included in units with rank and file workers when all contesting unions
have agreed,"' the Board in the future may adopt a sterner policy against
the commingling of those two classes of employees in the same bargaining
unit. In addition, the Board may demand, as a condition precedent to
certification, a physical segregation of, and a line of demarcation between,
107. See M. at p. 14, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 973; Matter of L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp.,
65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 687, 688 (1946); Matter of General Motors Corp.,
51 N.L.R.B. 457, 460 (1943) (dissent).
Note that the constitution of the Foremen's Association of America esxcludes from
membership supervisory employees who formulate management policy. History of Forc-
2n='s Association (1946) 17 LAB. REL. REP. 886, 887.
103. It is doubtful that management will be able to deprive supervisory employees of the
coverage of the Act by a colorable extension of their discretionary powers or by new, more
dignified job titles. Matter of Allied Steel Castings Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 17 LAB. RmL.
REP. 1114 (1946), the Board was not impressed by the title of "superintendent" given to a
former foreman, without an actual increase in authority.
109. Matter of California Pacldng Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 17 LAB. REL. REr. 1192
(1946).
110. See cases cited supra, note 58. This exception may, through broad interpretation,
extend the privileges of including both ranks of employees within one unit. See Matter of
Coos Bay Lumber Co., 62 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 16 LAB. REL. REP. 526 (1945), involving the
logging industry, in which the dissenting member strongly contested that such a custom did
not exist.
111. See note 59 supra.
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members of the separate bargaining units within the organization itself,"
2
as well as assurance that neither unit will be able to dominate or control the
other.'
1 3
In regard to the composition of the bargaining unit of supervisory em-
ployees, there is no doubt that the Board will exclude all supervisors in the
higher levels of management if their interests are inimical to those of the
groups being organized." 4 The Board has grouped several levels of supervi-
sion in one unit if all members possess a community of interest and no
marked disparity in rank.115 However, in recent cases involving distinct
levels of supervision, the Board has adopted a novel policy. Where there is a
marked divergence in rank and authority between different levels of supervi-
sors proposed for a single bargaining unit, and where at the same time
common backgrounds and problems establish a community of interest, the
Board has found it undesirable upon its own motion to establish separate
units."6 Supervisors in the highest level were given the opportunity to
determine by election whether or not they desired to be included in the unit
of the subordinate supervisory employees." 7 The bargaining units of super-
visory employees to be designated for a particular employer have been
modelled on the bargaining patterns established for the production and
112. See dissenting opinions by Chairman Millis in Matter of Maryland Drydock Co.,
49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943) and in Matter of Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Co,, 56 N.L.R.B.
1760 (1944), in which he specifically noted the desirability of segregation. See, also, Matter
of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 51, p. 10, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 971 (1946),
where the majority pointed out that the locals of supervisory employees met apart from the
rank and file members of the U.M.W.A.
113. Concurring opinion by Chairman Millis in Matter of Cramp Shipbuilding Co.,
52 N.L.R.B. 309, 312 (1943),reversing, 46 N.L.R.B. 115 (1942) (Maryland Drydock doctrine
controlling), in which he refused to certify a bargaining unit of supervisory employees to be
represented by the rank and file labor union because "organizational autonomy" was not
insured; cf. Matter of Columbia Machine Works, Inc., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 17 LAB. RE1L.
REP. 1112 (1946).
114. Matter of Simmons Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 820 (1946);
Matter of Fireboard Products, Inc., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 3 Prentice-Hall 1946 Labor Serv-
ice 16,369 (1946).
115. Matter of Packard Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 16 LAB. REL. REP. 168 (1945),
approved, 64 N.L.R.B. No. 204, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 506 (1945); Matter of L. A. Young Spring
& Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 17 LAB. REL. R e. 687 (1946); Matter of Ludlow Typo-
graph Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 1193 (1946); Matter of Auto-Lite
Battery Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 17 LAB. REL. REP. 1113 (1946).
116. Matter of Midland Steel Products Co., 65 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 17 LAB. REL. REP
858 (1946); Matter of Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 17 LAB. REL. REr,
975 (1946); Matter of Westinghouse Electric Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 17 LAB. REL.
REP. 1190 (1946); Matter of Hudson Motor Car Co., 67 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 17 LAB. REL.
RE. 1259 (1946); but cf. Matter of Murray Corp. of America, 47 N.L.R.B. 1003 (1943);
Matter of Boeing Aircraft Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 630 (1942), which are in effect overruled.
117. A policy of allowing various levels of employees to select, by election, an appropriate
unit, could result in a revision of the accepted procedure for designating appropriate units.
Compare Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 135 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) in which the
board was enjoined from delegating the selection of the bargaining unit to employees.
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maintenance workers, and technical and clerical subordinate employees of
the same company.
118
The Board can readily adapt its concepts to a labor movement including
supervisory employees. It now refuses to impute to the employer actions of
supervisory employees who are solicited for membership in an organiza-
tion. 119 If-there is no showing of encouragement, authorization or ratifica-
tion by management of campaign activities of supervisors who have per-
sonal interest in the movement, as contrasted with those who are volunteers,
employers will probably be under no liability for such actions.1 - On the
other hand, employers can be prevented from using these recently-gained
rights of foremen as a means for fostering company-dominated unions;
physical segregation of bargaining units and rigid standards of affirmative
neutrality of employers,1 21 can protect rank and file laborers against em-
ployer domination through friendly supervisors. Finally, the Board can
encourage resolution of problems resulting from unionization of super-
-isors at the conference table of labor and management.
118. Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. S1, 17 L.,. Ru. Rnp.
971 (1946); Matter of Westinghouse Electric Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 17 LAn. RE.
REP. 1190 (1946).
119. See note 93 supra.
120. Matter of B. F. Goodrich Co., 64 N.L.R.B. No. 216, 17 LAn. Ru.. Rr,. 546 (1945).
121. Compare Swift & Co. v. NLRB, 106 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939); Matter of
Cooper, Wells & Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 27 (1939); Matter of Wiclmire Bros., 16 N.L.R.B. 316
(1939).
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